



# Teaching or Transmission of Psychoanalysis?

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## ABSTRACT

This article critically examines the perennial debate surrounding the place of psychoanalysis within the university and its status as a teachable or transmissible body of knowledge. The author argues that the opposition between those who advocate for psychoanalysis' presence in academia and those who reject it conceals an underlying ethical problem concerning the analyst's desire and the distinction between teaching and transmission. By interrogating two competing conceptions of science—one closed, dogmatic, and rooted in a positivist tradition; the other open, aporetic, and grounded in the recognition of the impossible as the limit of reason—the text situates psychoanalysis within the second paradigm. Drawing principally on the work of Jacques Lacan, particularly his seminars of 1953–1954 and 1964, the article demonstrates that Lacan's understanding of the concept as that which replaces the thing, and his insistence on the axiomatic, *a priori* status of signifying logic, constitute a foundation for the scientificity of psychoanalysis. This scientificity, however, is not that of the natural sciences but rather one sustained by the *praxis* of the clinic and the perpetual reopening of concepts. The author concludes that psychoanalysis not only can but must be taught and transmitted within the university, not as a dogma but as a knowledge of the impossible that guarantees the ethical dimension of the human. The text also offers a critical reflection on the Colombian university context and on contemporary institutional developments within Lacanian psychoanalysis.

**KEYWORDS:** Psychoanalysis, University, Teaching, Transmission, Science, Concept, Lacan, Ethics, The Impossible, Praxis.

## INTRODUCTION

It is quite symptomatic, to say the least, that even today among analysts there is insistence on a double problematic, namely: first, whether analysts and psychoanalysis itself should be in university institutions; and second, whether psychoanalysis is or is not a scientific knowledge, and consequently, whether it is teachable or transmissible.

Regarding the first problem, the most striking thing is that those who speak against the presence of psychoanalysis and analysts in the university are precisely, for the most part, those who manage to retire from them, and after having lived a good part of their lives in them and extracted patient- students for their consulting rooms, they rise up to argue that psychoanalysis has nothing to do there.

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One of two things: either they are shameful teachers who have never been able to respond from their real knowledge or loyal understanding regarding what psychoanalysis is, generous liars and hucksters; or they are analysts who, mistaken about their function, become teachers without being able to fully gauge the mission they have upon entering the world of education in university centers.

In both cases, that of a teacher who claims to be an analyst, or of an analyst who becomes a teacher and does not understand his act in the university, what we have is the subject of complaint. However, this position is the constant of all, well almost all, university professors, those who only wait for retirement and meanwhile dedicate themselves to the repetition of repetition, producing a feeling of boredom and weariness that ends up reproducing the system, precisely what psychoanalysis has sought to denounce in its multiple manifestations.

To sustain the uselessness or non-convenience of psychoanalysis in the university, recourse is made to theorizations, syntagms, and life examples of men who, like Lacan, maintained that one should not imitate anyone.

In any case, in this duality, the problem of ethics also makes itself heard. A traditionally understood and lived university and a university that opens its doors and its understanding, without this overlooking the bureaucracy and the immovable positions of “some men of academia” regarding what is understood by science and scientific, appear on the horizon. Two conceptions that diverge substantially; this classification of two scientific paradigms - one positivist and closed, and another that recognizes the impossible as a limit - finds its support in the epistemological reflections of authors such as Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, who influenced Lacan's formation. In particular, Lacan takes up the notion of “conjectural sciences” and the idea that modern science, far from being based on an absolute truth, is founded on a style of concept formation that implies a relationship with the real as impossible. This is made explicit in his writing “Science and Truth” (1966), where he addresses the status of psychoanalysis in relation to the field of science, pointing out that psychoanalysis is not a science like the natural sciences, but rather is located in the place of the “subject of science” that modern scientific discourse produces and, at the same time, excludes; consequently, the importance of psychoanalytic knowledge in the university institution is reduced exclusively to the first of them. In the second conception, the university accommodates knowledge and understandings that are not necessarily exact or scientific in the strict sense: anthropology, sociology, sociobiology, quantum mechanics, probability mathematics, among others, allow these knowledge, determined by the discoveries of Frege, Cantor, and Gödel, to recognize the impossible in them, to recognize the impossible as the limit of reason.

Now, it happens in fact that our universities, I speak of Colombian ones, are a hybrid. On one hand, the existence of an impossible as a foundation is accepted, strange as that may be, and on the other hand, there is a sector that maintains the belief in the closed and dogmatic life of foundations, “atheistic” religiosity and religious atheism that coexist. Regardless of the conception one has of the university, the truth is that the presence of psychoanalysis and

analysts becomes urgent; well to deconstruct the “immovable” of the scientific and institutional or, and perhaps this is what determines the presence, to transmit psychoanalysis in its fundamentals to scientific culture and to point out that its ethics is that which recovers the human itself.

The analyst who has the grace to be a teacher, to be in the university and is caused by his desire, that of the analyst, cannot be confused in the exercise of fatigue and the repetitive transmission of what is already known and assured; he corresponds to another place, the place of the teacher, the place that has always been exploited by true researchers, by that which makes sparks fly from dogmatists and believers, who denounce religious belief and turn “true” questions into genuine places for the development of knowledge in, by, and for the human itself.

The teacher- analysts are teachers whose position is not far removed from that of the analyst, of that one who works and works, from what he believes he knows, always finding the question, the one that hurts to recognize in his knowledge, but, which ultimately shows what must be traversed, in one's own surprise, in order to provoke the desire to investigate in others.

This first problem, that of teacher- analysts, is closely linked to the decision of whether psychoanalysis is a science or not, and beyond the supposed simplicity of being or not in the university, what makes itself heard is an ethical problem, which becomes entangled with what is understood between teaching or transmitting on the part of analysts.

In the collective imagination, it is held that only what is scientific inhabits universities and only this is teachable. Teaching then is teaching science, and what is not such could be transmitted by other means that are not necessarily scientific means and tools. In this same imaginary, we find a path contrary to this form of conception. Science is what can be transmitted in the university and can be taught beyond its walls, because teaching is giving others knowledge that is not necessarily scientific.

Teach science or transmit it; teach what is not science or transmit it? Gibberish that ultimately makes us think about the scientific status or non-status of psychoanalysis. Let us conduct our reflection towards that there.

This article aims to address the following research question: What is the specificity of the transmission of psychoanalysis in the university setting based on Lacan's teaching, and how does this differ from the dominant university discourse? The objective is to analyze the conditions of possibility for teaching psychoanalysis at the university, not as a mere adaptation to academic discourse, but as an intervention that, from the analytic discourse, can interrogate the place of knowledge and sustain an ethics of the real. To this end, the conceptions of science at play, the function of the concept in Lacan's work, and the clinical and institutional implications of this transmission will be examined. To address this question, it is pertinent to resort to the Lacanian formalization of discourses, particularly the distinction between university discourse and analytic discourse, as developed in Seminar XVII, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*. In university discourse, knowledge occupies the place of the agent,

which implies a pretense of totality and a concealment of truth as cause. On the contrary, in analytic discourse, knowledge is located in the place of truth, as that which operates in the structure but cannot be completely apprehended or totalized. This structural difference is crucial for understanding that the problem does not lie in a simple opposition between ‘teaching’ and ‘transmission’ linked to the analyst’s desire, but in the position of knowledge in each discourse. The challenge for the analyst in the university is not, therefore, merely to ‘transmit’ an experiential knowledge, but to sustain a practice that, from the analytic discourse, can interrogate the place of knowledge in university discourse, introducing lack and questioning where the dominant discourse tends towards closure and doxa.

### IS PSYCHOANALYSIS A SCIENCE?

We have on the horizon two conceptions of science: one that maintains that once and for all the foundations, concepts, and experience are closed, and the other is the way in which all the previous aspects remain open and awaiting the questions that relaunch knowledge and understanding, always beyond any closure.

Of the first, it must be said that, in the strict sense, they are not theories. Closed theories do not exist, they are nothing more than the illusion of certainty itself, of that which tradition read from Descartes and reaches the world of recalcitrant logical positivism; its culmination is dogmatism, religion.

This reading, which has done more harm than is immediately apparent, is the one that has historically promoted the understanding that knowledge that does not have as its characteristic the closed, the dogmatic, or the result, the product, as quantifiable and measurable in terms of measure, has no place in the university world.

From this conception, it is impossible, in terms of regulation and discrimination, for any knowledge that is not hypothetical-deductive and supported by experience and that is not reproduced at the laboratory level, to come to be considered science.

This form of science, the one that existed at the time of Freud’s work, causes him, without realizing it, to have the judgment of believing that he was a scientist. The traditional sense of this science and its scientist is characterized by the fixing of phenomena *a posteriori*. This way of fixing phenomena, after the concept, directly privileges experience and, given this, then the arsenal of concepts is scrutinized, in the best of cases, or the laboratory of pre-concepts to definitively fix the theoretical corpus.

Operating in this way has the effect of making the phenomenon of experience coincide with the concept, so that it becomes closed once and for all; a procedure that guarantees the use of concepts from their definition, a guarantee that extends to all future practice.

It is less than evident that Freud proceeded in this way and even leaves us always with the question of whether what is called a concept will not undergo a new reconceptualization over time, based on new discoveries in the life sciences; however, what is also read in this conception is that concepts come from other parts that are not the field of experience itself, that they come from other fields, from other sciences, which shows that there is an original use of what

already existed on the part of psychoanalysis; however, insofar as they already existed, these concepts undergo a denaturalization when they are torn from the science in which they operate, explaining and defining “something” for which they were not conceived. Denaturalization on one side and naturalization of another field place on the horizon a plus of suspicion about the new science in the understanding of scientists.

On the other hand, this way of conceiving science, its foundations and its concepts, has an immense advantage for those who inherit it, because it becomes a constant, a form of security that translates into a concretion of a human tendency, namely: a natural tendency of the heirs, to the laziness that resists, that refuses the possibility of varying concepts or of abandoning them, because they are outdated, in favor of new ones that explain more simply and effectively what appears in experience as new, surprising, and uncalculated, of everything that shows the insufficiency of what is already established.

There is a tendency to keep things as they are, to work and operate with what has produced results in the past; we have an inclination for the canonical formula, for definitions given and accepted by and from authority.

Ultimately, concepts derived from authority are taken as immovable truths that only have the possibility of make-up or refinements to complete their explanatory power, or to remove or clarify what was already there and was not evident. Neither deformation, nor deconstruction, nor the expiration of concepts is accepted.

In this way of understanding and doing, necessarily, one does not have science, much less theories; it is the simplistic and whimsical vision of a positivism that dogmatizes, closes, and standardizes knowledge, understanding, and much less wishes to know about truth. And paradoxically, it does not accept the competition of other sciences or knowledge; it becomes extraterritorial and with it, a conception, a unique and complete vision of the world and phenomena. It does not admit the competition of other knowledge in the explanatory field nor the logical anteriority of the place from which its concepts come. It becomes pure myopia.

Consequently, it is only natural that science, this traditional, monastic, and religious science, turns the foundation, experience, and the concepts that accompany it into a complete myth, ironically, it does what it claims to reject. The myth, the scientific mythology that makes university discourse the absolute master.

There where the place of the agent is managed by knowledge that, imaginarily, is said to be absolute. The effects of this myth make themselves heard, boredom and repetition both at the level of the transmission of scientific knowledge and in the perpetuation of research that is nothing more than variations on a theme and its products are assured from what is canonized; these effects kill, without a doubt, the desire to know.

They skimp, they offer the illusion of discovering the truth despite the surprise that is unavoidable when teaching, when working in teaching and in science, which is recognized as a constant and always renewed elaboration.

In this sense, we have that, at the very heart of psychoanalysis, in its beginnings, myth has been placed, it has been made the articulating reason of the clinic and its concepts. Nothing surprising, nothing that cannot be verified.

Freud placed myth at the origin; his successors, the misnamed post-Freudians - of which they have nothing - or the Freudians themselves, placed Freud at the origin until transforming him into a “divinity”, into the omniscient father, into a true dogma and not into a theory among other possible ones; they made Freud the religious father and made his concepts a closed and sealed field for research that moves, eradicates, and does not produce the denaturalizing forcing of a concept from one theory to another.

Be it understood, I do not maintain that this was Freud’s intention, however, by Freud living in his writing, in his understanding, which was never to consider his investigation finished, closed, or definitive, that placing him in the seat of the pro-Father. This has been his destiny, they turned his investigation into a dogmatic closure and not a theory. It is not, then, against Freud as Freud, but against what they made of him that the warning goes.

Now, from this doing with Freud, with his theory and his clinic, a series of problems that are typically scientific in the traditional sense are verified. In the first instance, it must be understood that the concept tends towards closure, however, it does not imply this in itself, whereby the concept is always open, inexhaustible, which does not mean that they do not become exhausted. If this happens, in their exhaustion, for reasons of closure, new ones must appear, must be produced.

This that we could call the “co-substantiality” of the concept is denied, forgotten insofar as there is an urgency to fix, to immobilize the concept, to stop the permanent flow of phenomena and facts.

It is the explicit way to “temporalize” and apprehend phenomena and be able to work with them; however, from this operative mode to them becoming *doxa* and becoming dogmatized, there is a stretch that must be avoided. It is our problem, as analysts or scientists, to understand a double function in this way of operating: on one hand, we must make the “co-substantiality” of the concept, its tendency towards closure, function for the sake of the temporalization that enables work, and on the other hand, we must guarantee its open state, that it functions as that which awaits surprising at an unexpected moment.

Closing and keeping open or closing to open, is not just any coincidence; it is the clinical operation par excellence derived from the conceptual order and its apprehension. By not maintaining this closing to open, another of the most widespread problems in our psychoanalytic milieu arises: that of the generalization and abuse of a concept that, in principle, must remain in the theory or field where it was produced; thus, we make it say what X did not say and Y did. A hackneyed example, when we say the subject of Freud, or we make Freud say subject, he did not work with this concept, the meaning, the specificity of the concept in Lacan is lost, it becomes obscured.

Another problem is forcibly introducing a concept that belongs to one theory into another theory to make a state of affairs

comprehensible; it is a task of double falsification that ends up recasting what must remain consistent.

And finally, there is a problem born of erudition that cuts from here and there and beyond, to construct a bricolage that passes for knowledge and originality; or the syntagmatic citation that maintains unrestricted fidelity to the authors, passing for rigor.

Let us conclude the section by saying that this way of understanding, reading, and doing science, its foundation and its concepts, depends on the illusion of the existence of the subject supposed to know, embodied and wandering through the streets, classrooms, and consulting rooms.

## OF THE OTHER SCIENCE OR SCIENCE FOR LACAN

From the outset, we can maintain: if the way of establishing and fixing phenomena in Freud depends on the *a posteriori* of the concept, the way of establishing these, by Lacan, is on the side of a signifying logic that is *a priori*.

This has all the consequences one might want, to the point that we could debate for or against it, but what becomes evident is a different understanding and starting point between these two masters.

Now, regardless of the year one investigates in the vast Lacanian work, a constant is present, his critical *ethos* towards institutions, whatever their nature: scientific, psychoanalytic, university, among others.

Already in Seminar 1 “*Freud’s Papers on Technique*”, Lacan delivers a conception, although not novel, since it is dispersed in philosophy and mathematics, radically surprising for an analyst regarding the concept. There he tells us:

The concept which is there where the thing is not comes to replace the thing in the same way as the elephant that I brought into the room the other day by means of the word “elephant”. If this shocked some of you so much, it is because it was evident that the elephant was effectively here from the moment we named it<sup>1</sup>.

There where the thing was, there where the thing was, there where it became patent, the concept comes to border it, not to replace it. This precision is fundamental in light of what Lacan develops in Seminar VII, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, regarding *das Ding*. *Das Ding* is not an object that can be replaced by a concept; it is the ‘real heart of the unconscious’, the “beyond of the signifier”, the incurable real that resists symbolization. If in Seminar I Lacan emphasizes the power of the signifier to make an absence present (the elephant evoked by the word), in Seminar VII it is emphasized that there is a real nucleus that cannot be apprehended by the concept and that, precisely because of this, causes it. The concept, then, is not there where the thing “was” to take its place, but is structured around a void, a central lack which is *das Ding*. This conception allows us to grasp that the subject-concept relationship is not one of replacement, but of infinite approximation to a real that remains as its limit and its condition.

<sup>1</sup> Lacan, Jacques. Taken from: Seminario 1, página 351, Paidós, Buenos Aires, 1996.

The subject-object binomial is questioned by putting the concept in its place. The new relationship, the new binomial is subject-concept; concept that, by art, by *poiesis*, will be an object henceforth. This concept-object is what allows him to grasp, to take in logical time, what appears in the experience of the thing, allowing the investigation proper to the one who makes his desire to know about desire itself; a knowledge thanks to the fundamental relationship between the concept-object and the subject. A relationship driven by the incessant search for knowledge of desire and which, ultimately, will place in the concept-object, incompleteness, lack, as the aprioristic guarantor of the scientificity of psychoanalysis.

It is crucial to clarify that, although Lacan resorts to logic and mathematics to formalize psychoanalysis, this does not imply attributing an 'axiomatic status' to 'the thing'. On the contrary, as mentioned, *das Ding* is 'lawless' (Seminar VII). The axiom, in science, is that which cannot be demonstrated and which sustains all demonstration. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, what operates as a limit is not a logical axiom in the strict sense, but the real as impossible. Signifying logic is not an *a priori* that determines the content of the thing, but a tool to formalize the conditions of possibility of the analytic experience, always in relation to a real that ex-sists it and causes it. That is, psychoanalysis uses logic to approach a real that, by definition, escapes all logic.

Proof of this is his seminar. In itself, this is a concept that places a research project on the horizon; one that, if fulfilled, opens the panorama, the conceptual horizon, not to be confused with class preparation in which the teacher organizes knowledge meaningfully from his understanding without questioning it. The seminar is a risk that starts fundamentally from a questioning of the knowledge that is known, from an impasse or question that arises to question what is said to be known and the closed-universal.

An investigation, then, Lacan's investigation and with him, that of psychoanalysis, is a crossing, an exploding of the subject supposed to know; it bursts the teacher who embodies this, opens the closed by questioning, plunging the static into the realm of the meaningless. This supposed knowledge of the embodied teacher does not benefit psychoanalysis, it buries it, wears it down insofar as it is not exposed, does not show itself, much less demonstrate its power.

The knowledge of psychoanalysis and of the analyst enclosed in consulting rooms or in schools does nothing other than refuse risk, becoming knowledge and *praxis* for initiates and extraterritoriality in its refusal to be exposed. The knowledge of psychoanalysis, to avoid this mortal danger, must be exposed, a knowledge that proves its scientificity, precisely, in the spaces where it, science, has presence, in the university. It is the responsibility of analysts to be present in these traditionally constituted spaces to ensure the future of our knowledge and the practice itself. This is how the presence of the analyst in Colombian university institutions has direct clinical implications. On one hand, the training of future analysts is challenged by university discourse, which requires constant work of reading and discussion that prevents the dogmatic crystallization of concepts. The transmission of psychoanalysis in the university, being exposed to criticism and interdisciplinary debate, forces analysts to

formalize their knowledge rigorously, which has repercussions in a clinic more attentive to the particularities of the symptom in its context. On the other hand, university research can contribute to thinking about contemporary forms of discontent in Colombian culture (violence, displacement, mourning), offering conceptual tools that, although not applied directly in the cure, allow a critical reading of social phenomena that affect the direction of the cure. The articulation between the university institution and clinical practice is not, then, one of application, but of reciprocal interrogation: the clinic nourishes theory with its singular findings, and the university offers a space for formalization and transmission that prevents that theory from becoming dead knowledge.

Now, this presence, this being that makes "minus one", that inconveniences the university institution, normalized and religious science, the teachers who embody supposed knowledge, should not be confused with the presence of the analyst in institutions that claim to be universities, like Miller's latest invention: the popular university of psychoanalysis, which is nothing other than the latest hierarchization in the scale of schools, which is nothing more than reactions, responses to the real impotence of exposing psychoanalysis to the scientific community, to the impotence of knowledge exposed "in the open air".

The question of ethics is glimpsed at every moment, the ethics of psychoanalysis, that relating to the indestructible desire in the face of diagnoses, common *doxa*, collective alienisms, the one-dimensional voice of the master. The extraterritoriality of psychoanalysis is its specificity, its inability to share the symbolic phallus that supports traditional science, the subject supposed to know embodied in the teacher; it is an extraterritoriality to discourse, to that discourse, but it cannot be understood as maladjustment or social and scientific marginality.

Psychoanalysis is not an island, it cannot survive alone, isolated by itself, nor does its high degree of complexity lead it to mystical-shamanic thought as some have claimed. In this direction, Lacan reminds us, not only analysts, that there is no teaching without research; he invites us to an active presence, to an exposed questioning that presents itself for open confrontation with what is constituted and closed in science, to defend extraterritoriality before others, with others, and for others.

Evidence of this is recorded in his text *The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis*, from 1953, there he tells us, referring to the "university of psychoanalysis and analysts" of his time: "But have they not led to a disappointing formalism that discourages initiative by penalizing risk, and that makes the reign of the opinion of the learned the principle of a docile prudence where the authenticity of research becomes dulled before exhausting itself?"<sup>ii</sup>

Great question, great criticism of the non-scientificity of the psychoanalytic institute that extends to all teaching institutions. At this moment, Lacan's thought sees the possibility of investigating, of doing science, from a poetic flank, from a clarification of the

ii Función y campo de la palabra. Siglo XXI editores, twenty-third edition 2003. p 229.

field of speech and language, from the production and work with the unspeakable that is said in it.

He bets on the signifier, coming from linguistics, evidencing that any absolute is imaginary. A valid way of understanding, doing, and practicing psychoanalysis that arouses suspicion in the scientific community, however, this will not be the only form of psychoanalysis in Lacan; his histrionic genius will lead him to a new form, the one that begins with Seminar XI and that makes its presence in the place where the seminar on the Names-of-the-Father should have been. It is no longer the name-of-the-father, correlative at the end of the father himself, but the pluralization of the names that will place Lacan at a moment of closure of his work that will culminate with expulsion, with excommunication as he himself says, from the world of subjects supposed to know and their institutions.

This seminar faces in a decisive way, not the discourse of science, because he has already accounted for this in previous works, and not as is usually believed that one would have to wait until Seminar XVII for this, by immediately posing the question of whether psychoanalysis was a science.

Lacan goes directly to the question of the epistemic status of psychoanalysis, not to the epistemic status of science, which after all limps, but marches on; he does not seek to eradicate the modes of science, nor its technique, nor its discoveries based on the invention that becomes law, a law that operates in the real.

That question seeks to mark the specificity, to mark definitively what makes psychoanalysis a scientific impossibility in the traditional way, seeks to move from the register of the religious, canonical, and closed of the symbolic phallus to the minus phi, to the open and with it to the work that does not cease, that demands a *praxis*.

Psychoanalysis is a *praxis* that is supported by scientificity and its concepts. This relationship between psychoanalysis and science is specified in Lacan's writing "Science and Truth", where he affirms that psychoanalysis has as its condition the subject of science, that subject that modern scientific discourse produces and, at the same time, excludes. Psychoanalysis is not a Galilean science that aspires to mathematize the real in its totality, but rather constitutes itself as a *praxis* that operates with logical formalization to approach that which science leaves as a remainder: the divided subject, *object a*, truth as cause. The "conceptual reopening" that characterizes psychoanalysis is not a mere pedagogical resource, but a structural necessity: analytical concepts are logically formalized in order to be transmitted, but that same formalization opens them to the real that exceeds them. As Lacan points out, "mathematical formalization is our end, our ideal", but not because psychoanalysis can be reduced to it, but because it is the only way to write something of the real, to produce a knowledge that, although not-all, can operate in the clinic. The difference with the Galilean sciences lies, then, in that psychoanalysis does not seek to dominate the real through universal laws, but to locate its emergence in the singularity of the subject.

His intention is to move from the alienating and religious respect for Freudian concepts to a scientific use of them. He affirms that the nucleus, the heart of the Freudian work, what gives its fine and high notes is myth, and this seems most normal to us and we do

not question it and do not take note of it and its consequences. We turn a blind eye to this, but we do not tolerate a mythical reflection interfering in our inquiry and reflection, as it is a utopia without foundation for the clinic.

Science, contrary to the Freudian nucleus, myth, places in the nucleus, in what cannot or cannot manage to understand, the axiom, precisely that which cannot be demonstrated because it is the support of all demonstration.

### THE AXIOM IS NECESSARILY A *PRIORI* AND LIMIT

Let us state it clearly, science urges the *a priori*, it needs concepts without a referent. This is what Lacan does, let's see.

The foundational thing is the logic of the signifier, not simply the signifier. To say signifying logic is to bet on the side of mathematics, logic, and its broad manifestations.

The axiom, logic, ensures scientific competence, a scientificity, that enables a coming and going between the clinic and theory and vice versa; this is what makes it possible, for example, that we are gathered today, not so myth. It does not allow the return from the clinic to theory, to dogma to be precise, there is no return with myth, leaving the clinic with repetition and belief.

In the seminar "The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964)", class two, Lacan points out that analysts suffer from rejection of concepts, concepts that he precisely will take from Freud to deform them, to work on them and make them speak until they are exhausted, and exhausted by the demands of the clinic he proposes new concepts, the concepts that will henceforth direct the clinic, under the pretext of the resistance they produced in his followers and extends to today. A new way of understanding, doing, and practicing psychoanalysis. Two forms that persist to this day and that cause differences among Lacanian analysts themselves.

Let us recall a bit, Lacan tells us: "What do the formulas of psychoanalysis refer to? What motivates and modulates this slippage of the object? Are there analytic concepts formed, once and for all? The almost religious maintenance of the terms used by Freud to structure the analytic experience, what is it due to? Is it a very surprising fact in the history of sciences, the fact that Freud would be the first, and would remain the only one, in this supposed science, to have introduced fundamental concepts? Without this trunk, without this mast, this stake, where to anchor our practice? Can we even say that these are properly concepts? Are they concepts in formation? Are they concepts in evolution, in motion, to be revised?"<sup>iii</sup>

Marvelous forcefulness that will make Lacan expound his concept of the concept. The concept is approximation, the relationship that must be established with the concept is always, for analysts, in the form of infinitesimal calculus, with what can be infinitely close, but never closed, canceled, with what "is almost there" but can only be in its absence.

<sup>iii</sup> Jacques Lacan, Seminario XI, pages 18 y 19, Paidós, Buenos Aires, 2003.

Not in vain, he insists to us, that to be able to apprehend what makes reality, the real, one needs the leap, the crossing- step of the Rubicon, a quantum leap.

To conclude, let us remember that this way of proceeding with the concept not only responds to a question, to a difficulty of practice, scientific or clinical, but also obeys an ethical stance. Ultimately, Lacanian psychoanalysis is founded on concepts, it is a knowledge that bets on the open and has as its limit the impossible, which is equivalent to saying: scientificity of psychoanalysis.

It follows from this that psychoanalysis can and should be taught in the university in its dimension of theoretical and conceptual knowledge, that is, in its scientificity. What is transmitted in the university setting is the body of concepts, the logic of their formalization, and the ethics that guide them, insofar as these can be objects of debate, research, and criticism. However, it is imperative to distinguish this teachable knowledge from that which belongs to the order of the singular real and which can only be approached in the non-transferable experience of personal analysis. The presence of psychoanalysis in the university does not guarantee the 'ethical dimension' by itself, but inscribes it as a constant question: the question of the impossible, of desire, of the subject. It is in this interpellation of university discourse that psychoanalysis fulfills its ethical function, reminding us that there is a real that does not cease not being written and that, nevertheless, is the motor of all praxis.

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